The Roots of Moral Evil

Against reductions of moral evil to mere ignorance or failure of self-control, Hildebrand insists on the incommensurability of value and subjective satisfaction. Sometimes we act against our better knowledge, and not through weakness or intellectual error, but by giving in to the merely subjectively satisfying while ignoring, rather than misweighing, the important-in-itself. We choose this orientation subconsciously in a way that is deeper than any particular volition. This orientation is articulated as a relationship among our three “centers”: the centers of value-response, pride, and concupiscence. Moral evil arises whenever we ignore the important-in-itself altogether or just do not weigh it against higher values. Whenever we thus silence the first center, pride or concupiscence appears. This constitutes an enslavement, unlike when we yield to values, which ennobles us and expands our freedom. True to his phenomenological roots, Hildebrand offers intuitive examples and dissects them into typologies.

Hildebrand’s arguments show that the roots of moral evil and the temptation to self-blind, to dis-order the hierarchy of values which has at its summit the love of God and neighbor, are relentless. Though we may be inclined to believe that our disordered subjective pleasures remain only with us, Hildebrand warns that sinful absorption into immanent logic can not only be taken up by whole societies but also brought to bear against their most vulnerable. hings more deeply or to see things for the first time. I am still thinking about what he had to say.

This work provides a valuable augmentation of Hildebrand’s groundbreaking writings on ethics. Though the seeds of the issues addressed here are contained in Ethics and earlier works, the current material adds further explication and clarification of these ideas. As in other works, Hildebrand continues to display his unique talent for illustrating a wide spectrum of types of moral behavior with characters from literature, history, and his own personal experience. This brings abstract, theoretical ideas to life and down to earth, and thus also makes them applicable to medical professionals, who have to deal with these issues both in their patients and in themselves; though for some this philosophical discussion may nonetheless be somewhat challenging.

As in his other works, Dietrich von Hildebrand here is eminently readable and fills gaps in ethical understanding with a sensitive touch and a clear understanding of the lived experiences of human sinners — that is, all of us who are prone toward concupiscence, pride, and hatred. The book begins with an excellent overview of several erroneous accounts of moral evil, and von Hildebrand uses his deep understanding of value as an excellent frame for showing what truly leads man toward evil: Not a preference for a greater value over a lesser value, but a complete disregard for what is valuable in itself. In the subsequent sections, concupiscence, pride, and hatred are given excellent phenomenological treatments, with portraits of these various roots of moral evil that are, candidly, quite convicting. As with von Hildebrand’s other works, the book makes one desire to be better than oneself: to worship and praise God more and oneself less.

We find in this volume many significant developments and amplifications of Hildebrand’s published thoughts on moral evil. The result is as if a dialogue of Plato, long thought to be lost, has been found.